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Abstract
We model how excess demand or excess supply can be generated in
the presence of a social network of interactions, where agents are sub-
ject to external information and individual incentives. In this context
we study price ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial markets under equilibrium. In
particular, we isolate the role of these diﬀerent factors in the deter-
mination of price ﬂuctuations and describe non trivial sensitivities to
changes in equilibrium due to the existence of social interactions. We
characterize equilibrium and distinguish between stable and unstable
equilibrium. Crashes or bubbles are seen as out-of-equilibrium situa-
tions, preceeded by unstable equilibrium. Fluctuations under unstable
equilibrium are shown to be abnormal and particulary large. Also, we
show how ﬂuctuations of the external information ﬂows aﬀect the ﬂuc-
tuations of the return process. In all cases we explain the well-known
phenomena that prices do not ﬂuctuate upwards in the same way as
they ﬂuctuate downwards. This asymmetry of price ﬂuctuations is due
to asymmetries in the price elasticity of demand and supply curves at
the level deﬁning equilibrium.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper builds a model of individual decision making in the context of
equilibrium ﬁnancial markets with social interaction. The notion of social
interaction takes into account the fact that individual choices are aﬀected
by the others’ decisions and characteristics. In any model in Economics this
happens somehow. Typically, agents interact indirectly through the prices,
these prices reﬂecting the participation of each individual in the market place.
In contrast, the type of interdependencies that we model directly link the in-
dividuals. With this type of models we can see how the behavior of one agent
may aﬀect the preferences of the others without being mediated through the
equilibrium price.
Among the economists there has been an increasing recognition of the
importance of social interactions in economic behavior. A very early study
of the role of social interactions in binary choice is Schelling (1973). The in-
tuition that individuals seek to conform to the behavior of reference groups
has found many applications. An important case is to consider the interac-
tions within a close neighborhood as in Loury (1977), B´ enabou (1993) and
Durlauf (1996a,b).
This concept of behavior driven by social interactions, although recent in
economics, has been theorized by sociologists. Early examples can be found
on the literature about ghetto poverty, such as Lewis (1966) and Liebow
(1967), for example. More recent treatments such as Wilson (1987) empha-
size the social multiplier that converts changes in private utility to changes
into community-wide behavior. This tradeoﬀ between private behavior and
pression to conform will drive our theoretical work.
2The potential role of social interactions has been demonstrated in con-
texts that are not restricted to neighborhoods. Brock (1993) shows how these
eﬀects may help explaining asset market volatility and Brock and Hommes
(1997) show further how they can produce complex aggregate price dynam-
ics. This paper is very close in spirit to this line of research. More recent
papers in this line linking directly these models to their Statistical Mechanics
counterpart are the works of Durlauf (1999) and Brock and Durlauf (2001).
We apply this model speciﬁcally to the ﬁnancial markets, assuming a
population that either buy or sell a given ﬁnancial asset. The buying/selling
behavior of the others aﬀects one’s utility and, therefore, one’s decision. The
utility function is also considered as depending on external information and
on individual incentives. Individuals being diﬀerent from each other have
diﬀerent private incentives. In a very large population it is not feasible to
describe the diﬀerent incentives one by one. Rather, the distribution of such
private incentives is modeled by a probability density. Thus, private incen-
tives are described as a random variable with diﬀerent realizations for each of
the market participants. We refer to such random variable as a random ﬁeld.
The recent papers of Durlauf (1999) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) develop
a particular treatment of individual preferences that incorporate individual
incentives in an explicit way that maps the problem into the Ising Model
with random ﬁelds. The randomness of such individual incentives generate
ﬂuctuations in equilibrium prices. The presence of social interactions are
shown to aﬀect the nature of prices even in the absence of external informa-
tion ﬂow. Such ﬂuctuations are shown to be particularly sensitive to change
in individual incentives for some critical values of the model’s parameters.
Moreover, we show how the presence of ﬂuctuations of external information
3is propagated to the market price ﬂuctuations.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium values of the average trading attitude
(buying or selling) and distinguishes between stable and unstable equilibria.
Under the latter, deviations from equilibrium are much more likely to occur.
Section 4 describes to type of price ﬂuctuations: the ﬁrst due to the random-
ness of individual incentives, characterizing the ﬁnite population equilibrium
convergence to an inﬁnite population equilibrium, and the second due to
changes in the external information. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a system of N i n v e s t o r si nag i v e ns t o c k . A te a c hp o i n ti nt i m e
some of these investors are willing to buy, and the others are willing to sell.
This willingness is deﬁned as a trading attitude. For simplicity, we assume
that each investor buys or sells the same amount of shares, normalized to 1.
Let the trading attitude of individual i at time t be modelled as a binary
variable si(t)=±1,i =1 ,...,N. These variables are interpreted to have
the following meaning. If si = +1, individual i is willing to buy, if si = −1,
individual i is willing to sell. We say that a conﬁguration of attitudes at time
t is stable if no investor feels pressure to change his/her attitude. As usual,
we also say that markets are in equilibrium at time t if we have
P
si(t)=0 , in
which case attitudes may be transformed into buying and selling actions. An
equilibrium conﬁguration is a stable conﬁguration satisfying the equilibrium
condition above.
We assume that the conﬁguration of attitudes may evolve from an equi-
4librium conﬁguration due not only to the arrival of information ﬂows from
the market place but also also due to the inﬂuence that investors exert over
each other. In that case, the arrival of new information takes the system from
equilibrium, generating a new stable conﬁguration of attitudes. Within this
new conﬁguration there will be either an excess demand or an excess supply
for the stock, generating price pressure. Prices change in such a way that this
stable conﬁguration becomes unstable and evolves until a new equilibrium
is reached. In what follows we characterize the diﬀerent elements that may
aﬀect the investors’ trading attitudes.
2.1 The Eﬀect of Social Norms
Under no interaction between individuals, we assume that an isolated indi-
vidual will not discriminate between a buying and a selling attitude, and will
decide with equal probability in favor of si =+ 1o rsi = −1. Given no social
interaction these choices are independent of other individuals’ choices. Let











Clearly, if individuals decide with equal probability between a buying and a
selling attitude, the average value of mN is zero.
Still in the setting of no direct interaction between individuals, let us
now consider that the individuals are in a coercive situation, where a social
pressure to conform exists. This coercion may be exerted by a majority, the
5existence of leaders, communication media and/or other factors, like social
norms, that may induce the direction of everybody’s trading attitude. A
typical example is the release of public news about the stock. In the case
of good news, such as an increase in dividends, a strong pressure to buy
will appear. The opposite case of bad news will lead to a natural pressure
to sell the stock. Let hc denote the intensity of this coercion. Its sign just
deﬁne whether this coercion is in the direction to induce to buy, in which
case hc > 0, or in the direction to induce people to sell, in which case hc < 0.
We assume that isolated individuals conform with these social forces from
the external environment and each of them will choose the attitude that
maximizes
u1i = hcsi. (3)
No matter how small hc is, a small degree of coercion induces a stable con-
ﬁguration of either massive buying attitudes or massive selling attitudes and
no equilibrium is attainable.
2.2 The Eﬀect of Social Interaction
We now turn to the eﬀect of interactions, exchanges and contacts between
individuals, abstracting from the eﬀect of external coercion. Considering a
pair of individuals i and j, they can either agree with respect to the trading
attitude, in which case sisj =+ 1 , or disagree, in which case sisj = −1. We
introduce J>0 as a measure, in utility terms, of the degree of interaction
or exchange. The level of agreement for a given pair (i,j)i st h u sm e a s u r e d ,
in utility units, by
Jsisj, (4)
6being +J in case of agreement and −J in case of disagreement. A given indi-
vidual i interacts with, say, n other individuals, labeled k1,k 2,...,k n, with a
set of given attitudes {sj}j∈Ii , where Ii = {k1,k 2,...,k n}. We assume that,
in the absence of external coercion, investor i chooses his/her attitude such
as to maximize what is perceived as his/her total degree of agreement (the
attitude being kept constant over all social contacts). Attitudes, however,
are not observable. What one observes is the buying/selling behavior. Let-
ting Ei(x) denote the subjective expected value of the random variable x for





Let us now determine what happens when both eﬀects, social external
coercion and interactions between individuals, occur simultaneously. In that
case, it is obvious that every agent will choose the attitude that is aligned
with hc, that is to say, choose the attitude with the same signal as hc. In that
way, each individual i maximizes the sum




and, at the same time, maximizes each of its components. Again, no matter
how small hc is, a small degree of coercion induces a stable conﬁguration of ei-
ther massive buying attitudes or massive selling attitudes and no equilibrium
is attainable.
2.3 The Eﬀect of Personal Values
Until now we have discussed two eﬀects: the tendency to conform with social
external norms and the interaction with other individuals. We now turn
7to a third relevant factor, namely the fact that each person, in her or his
capacity as a group member, is ap r i o r ibound to a certain attitude by his/her
idiosyncratic preferences. An additional factor is then required in order to
c o n v e ya l lt h a ti si n c u l t a t e di ne a c hp e r s o nb yt h ec u l t u r ei nw h i c hh eo rs h e
lives, leading the person to be ‘personally’ inclined to opt, for example, for
a positive rather than a negative attitude. This factor should act on each
individual like the external coercion factor, except that it is person speciﬁc.
If, for individual i, the intensity of this factor is αi, the isolated inﬂuence of
this additional factor leads him or her to maximize
u3i = αisi. (7)
Here, αi may vary in sign and intensity from one individual to another.
Depending on the nature of the model to be implemented, one may use
either a conﬁguration of known {αi} or else, assume a probability distribution
p{αi}. Together with the other factors, we assume that individuals choose
their attitudes so as to maximize




where hi = hc + αi is the eﬀective ﬁeld acting over agent i.
2.4 Uncertainty in the Utility
Given the impact of the social interaction in the choice of the agents’ attitude,
the utility of any individual will be a random variable. Its realization will
depend on the realization of the others’ attitudes. We assume that the opti-





Following Brock and Durlauf (2001), we make the common assumption
that the diﬀerence of these two random disturbances is a random variable
logistically distributed. In other words, for each i there exists βi ≥ 0s u c h
that
Pr[²i(−1) − ²i(+1) ≤ z]=
1
1+e x p ( −βiz)
.
This is suﬃcient to characterize the probabilistic distributions of various
choices. For example, for i 6= j,
Pr[si|Hi,Ei(sj)] = Pr[Hi(si)+²i(si) >H i(−si)+²i(−si)] ∝ exp[βiHi(si)].
Independence of the random utility terms ² implies that the joint proba-
bility measure of a conﬁguration {si} is given by
Pr[{si}|Hi,Ei(sj)∀i,j 6= i]=Πi exp[βiHi(si)]. (9)
The model is closed assuming that each agent has rational expectations,
meaning that all subjective expectations Ei(sj) can be replaced by the math-
ematical expectations E(sj), where these expectations are conditioned to the
diﬀerent βi and the parameters of Hi. It follows (see e.g., Brock and Durlauf,
2001) that the mathematical expectations of the individual choices are de-
termined by the set of N coupled equations












In his seminal work, Keynes (1934) describes how professional investors be-
have in the market. In his view, they prefer to analyze how the crowd of
investors is likely to behave in the future, rather than devoting their energy
estimating fundamental values. He used the example of a beauty contest to
illustrate this point. In order to predict the winner of a beauty contest, ob-
jective beauty is not as important as the knowledge (or prediction) of others’
prediction of beauty.
In this paper we shall make this same important simplifying assumption
in order to solve the model and understand the possible equilibria of this
system. The main assumption is that individuals that take seriously into
account the inﬂuence of others in the determination of their attitudes, tend
to adopt the same attitude as what they predict the average buying or selling
attitude to be.
Similarly, Galam and Moscovici (1991) formalize the emergence of a group
as such in a social-psychological context and assume that, in equilibrium, the
interaction of individual i with each of his/her neighbors with expected atti-
tude E(sj) can be replaced by the Law of Large Numbers with the interaction





















E(sj) → JnmN as N →∞ ,
and substituting the sum above in the expression (8) for Hi we get
Hi = hJsi + hisi
= ˜ hisi,
where
˜ hi = hJ + hi.
In other words, the result of the assumption underlying (11) is that, when
N increases without bound, the attitudes become asymptotically uncoupled.
Notice, however, that this is not the same asymptotic system as if J =0f r o m
the beginning. In fact, Hi above resembles very much to u3i in equation (7),
with αi replaced by ˜ hi. But, as opposed to αi, this last factor depends on J,
the coupling constant. Hence, each agent will maximize Hi above by choosing









Using the fact that mN =(
PN
i=1 si)/N and that hJ tends to JnmN as N













11Thus, given {si},J,h c and {αi}, the value of aggregated utility H is a
function only of the mean attitude mN. Clearly, the optimal value of H
must be associated with a unique value of mN. Av a l u eo fmN, however, is
not associated with a unique conﬁguration of attitudes {si}. Several diﬀerent
conﬁgurations may lead to the same value of mN. In that sense, equilibrium
is not unique. Also, because the solution of our model comes only within the
decoupling context, and this requires an asymptotic system, we shall refer
to the stable (and equilibrium) values of mN as m. The number of possi-
ble conﬁgurations compatible with one given value of m may thus become
very large. In order to have the relative weight of diﬀerent values of m,a
probability measure describing its asymptotic distribution is required.
3.2 The Stable Values of m
For the special case of deterministic private incentives (hi = h,∀i)w h e r et h e
distribution of random terms are identical across agents (βi = β,∀i), use of






We deﬁne B = βh. Thus, the proportionality constant ZN should correspond














































Hence the expected mean trading attitude m can be directly obtained from












− lncosh(ην + B)
with ν = β2Jn, implying that all the probabilistic mass is concentrated at
the minima of the above function satisfying the ﬁrst-order conditions
η = tanh(ην + B).
The value of η that solves this equation is thus a function of B,t ob e













+l nc o s h [ η(B)ν + B]
o
= η(B).
13Since by the Law of Large Numbers the probability distribution of m is
degenerated in the considered limit, it follows that E(m)=m with proba-
bility 1 and thus m must satisfy
m =t a n h[ β (nJm + h)],
that can be seen as the particular version of equation (10) for this case.
In order to consider the contribution of the idiosyncratic inﬂuences hi,w e
should replace the expression nJm + h,r e ﬂecting the limit value of hJ + h,
by the eﬀective total random inﬂuence nJm + hi. Under the integrability
condition E(|h|) < ∞, Amaro de Matos and Perez (1991) show that the








where Bi = βhi. The solution for the stable mean attitude is shown to read
m =
Z
p(hi)tanh[β (nJm + hi)]dhi (16)
This equation generalizes the above equation for m and gives the implicit
stable values of m for arbitrary random ﬁelds hi.
3.3 Phase Diagram
T h es t a b l ev a l u e so fm are solutions of the above equation (16). In the simple
initial case, where the probability mass of the random ﬁeld hi is concentrated
around the value h,i fβJ>1, there is a critical value of βh above which
there is a single solution to (16) and below which there exist three diﬀerent
solutions.
14As pointed out in Durlauf (1999), this means that when private incentives
(expressed by h)a r es u ﬃciently weak, then the desire for conformity (as
measured by J) present in individual decisions may generate multiple, self-
consistent stable behaviors. In turn, this means that the relationship between
the individual incentives and aggregate behavior can be highly nonlinear. For
example, close to criticality, a small change in h may change the number of
stable values for m in the system.
For the more general general case of random hi, we refer to Salinas and
Wreszinski (1985) to characterize the possible minima of f,a n dt h u st h e
possible values of stable mean attitudes. Typically, and depending on the
values of β,J and on the probability p(hi), there may be diﬀerent types of
minima for f∗(η). If η∗ is a minimum of f∗(η), then a Taylor expansion













We call k t h et y p eo ft h em i n i m u mη∗ and θ its strength.
The several diﬀerent possibilities are
1. one global quadratic minimum (k =1 ) ;
2. two global quadratic minima (k =1 ) ;
3. several quadratic minima (k =1 ) ;
4. one global quartic minimum (k =2 ) ;
5. one global minimum (k =3 ) .
15Notice that the solutions that minimize f∗(η) correspond to stable values
of average trading attitude, not necessarily to equilibrium. Equilibrium is
attained only for those stable conﬁgurations of trading attitudes that imply
m = 0. Also, criticality of the parameters occur only in the last two cases.
Studying equilibrium means to study the cases where m =0 .I fw eh a v ea
case where m =0a n dk>1, we then know that the system is under an
unstable equilibrium i nt h es e n s et h a tal i t t l ec h a n g eo fp a r a m e t e r s( β,J or
h) may take it away from equilibrium to a diﬀerent stable conﬁguration of
trading attitudes (m 6= 0), generating an excess demand or an excess supply
for the asset.
4 Price Fluctuations in Equilibrium
In this Section we are going to consider a system initially at equilibrium.
This means that the average trading attitude is zero. If the system is com-
posed of inﬁnite agents this is indeed true. However, for any ﬁnite system,
whenever an agent chooses his/her behavior based on the perceived mean at-
titude of the others, his/her resulting utility is random, allowing the average
trading attitude to ﬂuctuate around zero. In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sS e c t i o nw e
study the impact of such ﬂuctuations in prices. In the second part we study
how ﬂuctuations of the random ﬁeld aﬀect the dynamics of prices, when the
system evolves in equilibrium.
164.1 Static Fluctuations
4.1.1 Fluctuations of m
In what follows we assume equilibrium i.e., m = 0. For any real γ,c o n s i d e r
the following random variable
AN =
PN
i=1 si − Nm
N1−γ .
Hence, we can write
mN = m + N
−γAN.
In the case of strict social interaction, i.e., when hi = 0, Ellis and Newman
(1978) have shown that, with γ = 1
2k and as N →∞ , AN is distributed






In other words, away from criticality (k = 1), equilibrium ﬂuctuations of the
average trading attitude are Normal. At criticality, or at unstable equilibrium
(k = 2), equilibrium ﬂuctuations of the average trading attitude are non-
Normal, with much higher variance. The latter case reﬂects a situation where
any slight change of parameters leads the system into an excess demand or
excess supply of assets, leading the system away from the original equilibrium.
Under the presence of random ﬁelds, Amaro de Matos and Perez (1991)
have shown that, with γ = k
2(2k−1) and as N →∞ , AN is distributed accord-





17if k =1 ,w h e r eu◦ is a Normal random variable, with mean zero and variance







Notice that the diﬀerence in the scaling factor γ implies that critical ﬂuc-
tuations under random ﬁelds are higher than under strict social interaction,
implying that the unstable equilibrium is more unstable under the presence
of individual incentives.
4.1.2 Price Fluctuations
Considering that m ﬂuctuates around zero, we consider in this Section what
happens to the equilibrium price under such ﬂuctuations. Let P be the initial
stock price and εs (P)a n dεd (P) denote respectively the elasticities of the
supply and demand curve at that price level.
If dm > 0, there will be a pressure on the demand for the stock, and the
stock price should increase to restablish equilibrium. In that case the excess





Notice that, in equilibrium, the transacted amount Q is always N/2. The




If, on the other hand, dm < 0, this reﬂe c t sa ne x c e s ss u p p l ya n dt h e
stock price should decrease to restablish equilibrium. In that case the excess





where εd(P) < 0 is now the elasticity of the demand. The corresponding




Given that we know the distribution of dm, we can characterize the dis-
tribution of the returns. Away from criticality, this model leads to Normally
distributed returns if the equilibrium price is such that |εd(P)| = |εs(P)|.
However, if these two elasticities are diﬀerent, as it is likely to occur, the
distribution of the returns will be Two-Piece-Normal distributed, reﬂecting
unbalanced risk, biased towards the direction of higher elasticity.
At criticality, the distribution of returns can also be characterized al-
though in this case there are no closed formulas for the volatility. Here,
if |εd(P)| > |εs(P)| there is a higher probability that excess supply domi-
nates out-of-equilibrium deviations, leading to a crash. On the other hand, if
|εd(P)| < |εs(P)| there is a higher probability that excess supply dominates
out-of-equilibrium deviations, leading to a bubble.
4.2 Dynamic Fluctuations
U n t i ln o w ,w eh a v ed e a l tw i t ha ne ﬀective ﬁeld hi = hc + αi decomposed
as a random variable hi plus a constant value hc. Hence, appart from that
constant value hc, the probability density p(hi) describes the distribution of
the individual incentives among the agents and can be replaced without any
loss of generality by p(αi) to describe the stable conﬁgurations as satisfying
m =
Z
p(αi)tanh[β (nJm + αi + hc)]dαi.
19We now shall consider how the dynamics for the external ﬁeld hc may
aﬀect the time evolution of equilibrium prices. As before, the starting point
is that for equilibrium to exist, the value of m must be zero. From equation
(16), we can write




p(αi)tanh[β (nJm + αi + hc)]dhi.
Imposing m = 0 as a solution implies that
Z
p(αi)tanh[β(αi + hc)]dαi =0 .
Given that p(αi)i sg i v e na n dﬁxed, and the integral runs over all possible
values of αi, the above equality must be seen as determining β as a function
of the level of the external ﬁeld hc. Hence, in equilibrium we write
f [m,hc]=
Z
p(hi)tanh[β (hc)(nJm + αi + hc)]dαi. (17)
4.2.1 Information Flow and Price Pressures
With m = 0, the fact that there is a ﬂow of information in the market about
the stock is modeled in this context as a one dimensional stochastic ﬁeld hc
satisfying the diﬀusion stochastic diﬀerential equation
dhc = ahdt + bhdWt.
A change dhc in the external ﬁeld will have as an immediate eﬀect a change
dm in the initial value m =0 .





εs (P)i f dm > 0
εd (P)i f dm < 0 (18)
20The ﬁrst thing to notice is that returns under good news and under bad news
do not have necessarily the same behaviour. In order to study the dynamics
of prices, we must therefore study the dynamics of equilibrium attitudes dm
under the arrival of information ﬂows. This is done next.
4.2.2 The Dynamics of m
Changes in hc will generate changes in m. Given equation (17), if hc follows
ad i ﬀusion process, m will also follow a diﬀusion process by Itˆ o’s Lemma.
Let the diﬀusion process of m be given by
dm = amdt + bmdWt.
Equation (17), allows us to write dm = df . In order to explicitly write am
and bm,w eu s eI t ˆ o’s Lemma to explicitly write df and identify the drift
and diﬀusion coeﬃcient for both diﬀusions. Details for df are given in the
Appendix, leading to
am = ah
































(β + hcβ0)φ(1) + φ(α)
1 − βJnφ(1)
.
These are the drift and the diﬀusion coeﬃcient for the average trading atti-
tude, generating a price process
dP
P
=2 ( amdt + bmdWt) ×
εs (P)i f dm > 0
εd (P)i f dm < 0 (19)
constrained to the values of β satisfying the equilibrium condition
Z
p(αi)tanh[β(αi + hc)]dαi =0 .
4.2.3 Some Particular Cases
We now analyse some special cases. In the absence of social interactions
(J =0 )w eh a v e











bm = bh[(β + hcβ
0)φ(1) + φ(α)],
together with the equilibrium constraint
Z
p(αi)tanh[β(αi + hc)]dαi =0 .
A more trivial solution can be found satisfying the above constraint by
considering the solution for very small β. In fact, the equilibrium constraint
22is trivially satisﬁed for β =0 . I nt h a tc a s eΦ(1) = 1,Φ(α)=E(α)a n d




and the price process reads
dP
P
=2 E(α)(ahdt + bhdWt) ×
½
εs (P)i f dm > 0
εd (P)i f dm < 0 (20)
Notice that even in this very simple case, upward ﬂuctuations of the price
process are diﬀerent from downwards ﬂuctuations.
In particular, if hc →∞ , meaning that the external information is too








If the above condition is not satisﬁe d ,w ew i l lh a v ei nt h a tl i m i t
Φ(x)=∆(x)=0
leading to am = bm =0 .
5 Final remarks
In this work we have studied the impact of social interactions on price ﬂuctu-
ations in ﬁnancial markets under equilibrium. Social interactions are not the
only relevant ingredient determining price ﬂuctuations. External information
and individual incentives are as essential as the social pressure to conform.
23We were able to understand and isolate the role of diﬀerent factors in the
determination of price ﬂuctuations, and to describe non trivial sensitivities
to changes in equilibrium due to the existence of social interactions.
In particular, even under the absence of information ﬂows, ﬂuctuations
in the decision about whether or not to invest under equilibrium may lead
to non-trivial price ﬂuctuations. In equilibrium situations in the vicinity
of crashes or bubbles, price ﬂuctuations are shown to become much larger.
Deviating from equilibrium, in our model, means to attain a stable conﬁgura-
tion of trading attitudes that generate either an excess supply, in which case
we would have a crash, or an excess demand, in which case we would have
a bubble. Such deviations are possible from equilibrium, provided that the
system passes through what we have called unstable equilibria. The point
was made that such transitions are highly sensitive to variations on the in-
dividual incentives. This sensitivity is due basically to the presence of the
social interactions.
We also show that upward and downward equilibrium ﬂuctuations are dif-
ferent in size, basically due to the fact that, in general, the demand elasticity
is diﬀerent from the supply elasticity at the equilibrium price level.
Finally, we considered the case where there is an information ﬂow, leading
to stochastic ﬂuctuations of the external inﬂuence. Such ﬂuctuations are
shown to aﬀect the equilibrium price process of assets in ﬁnancial markets.
The stochastic nature of the information ﬂow inﬂuences the price process, and
the equilibrium constraint implies that the probabilistic parameter regulating
how the decision of an agent aﬀects the uncertainty about his/her utility
changes with the intensity of external inﬂuence. For small enough values
of this probabilistic parameter, the ﬂuctuations of prices are seen to reﬂect
24trivially the ﬂuctuations of the external information. Another implication of
the model is that for strong enough external inﬂuence, it may be extremely
hard to satisfy the equilibrium condition, in which case the price process
would not ﬂuctuate.
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A Rewriting the sum over states ZN
















































































Making the change of variables ν = β2Jn and
η = x(νN)
−1/2,














− lncosh(ην + B).
27Using the Laplace asymptotic method, we can now study the asymptotic








exp[Nf(η)]dη =m i n
η f(η).
That is to say, asymptotically the sum over all states ZN has its probabilistic
mass fully concentrated over the conﬁgurations leading to the minimum value
of f and thus satisfying the ﬁrst-order conditions
η = tanh(ην + B).
B Deriving the Diﬀusion Process for df







































































































exp(x)+e x p ( −x)
and
coshx =















We then have for the several derivatives,
fm = βJnΦ(1)










0hc + β)∆(1) − 2β
0∆(α)
fhm = −2Jnβ[(β
0hc + β)∆(1) + ∆(α)],
with Φ(x)a n d∆(x)d e ﬁned as in the main text.
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